DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA OF ONE'S
OWN CHECK.
I. Development of Principle. The purpose of this article
is to maintain that a donatio morris causa may be well executed,
in equity, upon the giving of a check by the donor, even
though the check is not paid or presented before the donor's
death.
The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley, 165 U.S. 634, strengthens the
doubt of those who have questioned certain English decisions
by courts of the first instance denying validity to such gifts.
Since there are a few cases, a very few, in which the gift
under such circumstances has been held to have failed for
want of execution, it is just as well to say at the outset that
there is no desire to cut a figure by assailing decisions of
courts of great respectability. The work of reverting to the
main column of decisions, from which it is apprehended some
temporary wandering has occurred, is the present and more
gracious endeavor.
Let it be remembered that it was recognized at a very early
day that "there are many articles which might be made the
subjects of a donation mortis causa, in which a manual delivery
might be inconvenient or impracticable."' Thus delivery of
the key to bulky casks wherein wines, etc., are, was allowed
as delivery of possession because, said Lord Hardwicke, "it is
the way of coming at the possession or to make use of the
thing." '

The law having recognized the principle that delivery of
the means of coming at possession is sufficient evidence of a
gift, plenty of occasions arose to give the principle activity.
In 1744, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke had before him Snel,grove v. Bailey, 3 Atk. 214. In that case the bond of a third
person in favor of donor was delivered by the donor to the
-donee as a gift mortis causa. Lord Hardwicke held that there
I2 Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30.
Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 43, 443.
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was a good gift. He said: "You cannot sue at law without
the bond; for though you may give evidence of a deed at law
that is lost, yet you cannot of a bond, because you must make
a profert of it." Now this language of the chancellor was very
narrow and needlessly technical; but nevertheless it recognized
anew the doctrine applied in the case of keys to articles inconvenient of carriage, viz.: that delivery of the means of getting
at the possession will effect a good donatio mortis causa which
equity will enforce.'
The recognition of the effect of Snelgrove v. Bailey was for
a long time slow, and much contested. There was much
incumbrance, too, by other difficulties. In cases of mortgages,
there was question whether the statute of frauds operated to
prohibit parol gifts of what might be thought to convey interests
'As the text intimates, Snelgrove v. Bailey has the appearance of
resting on narrow grounds: Delivery of the bond is actual delivery of
some property; the law puts it in the donee's power, by destruction of
the bond, to destroy donor's action (at common law) by thus preventing
profert. Moreover, the English law was that bonds have locality, and
are bond notabilia, so that the administration must be taken out in the
diocese where it is found. These things being so, delivery of the bond
was quite a clear manifestation of a parting with dominion, and was
sufficient to satisfy a chancellor that he should enforce the intent of the

donor. If we regard these as being the chancellor's reasons, and regard
the decision as lacking support on any general principle applicable in
cases of instruments other than bonds, then we are compelled to regard
the decision of that great judge as being an isolated and arbitrary one.
For there are other instruments delivery of which attest quite as strongly
the purpose of yielding dominion; as where a mortgagor, or a third
person's note is handed over to a donee. The reasons of Lord Hardwicke
appear, however, to be put in the way of illustration of a general principle.
There are two indications of this, as Lord Eldon pointed out in Dufflield
v. Elwes, x Bli. N. R. In the opinion, Lord Hardwicke refers to
delivery of government tally sticks, etc., as analogous cases. And in
Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, decided by him eight years afterwards,
after remarking that he could go no further than he went in Snelgrove v.
Bailey, he went on to say that since the stock receipts of his day were
"waste papers," "no evidence of the thing," delivery of them was of no
avail to sustain the gift. This shows quite clearly that his theory in
Snelgrove v. Bailey was that he could extend aid where the instrument
delivered represented the debt in such a manner that if the donor
parted with it the donor delivered the means of getting at possession.
Snelgrove v. Bailey, then, must be taken to assert a general principle,
one not confined to the cases of bonds, as is well explained by Lord
Eldon in the complementary case of Duffield v. Elwes, i Bli. N. R. 497.
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in land.' In the case of certificates of stock, trouble was encountered by reason of the requirement, that transfer must be
approved by the corporation and registered in the corporation
books. This difficulty is possibly not entirely cleared away,
yet, although one can scarcely see how any court can hesitate
here unless it is ready to overrule Lord Hardwicke and Lord
Eldon. We think these difficulties disappear, so soon as it is
appreciated that the courts recognize the theory of equitable
assignment as between donor's estate and the donee, upon a
delivery by the donor of the means of getting possession.
In Duffield v. Owes, I Bli. N. R. 497, there was delivery of a
bond for £2927, and of a mortgage securing the same money;
also there was delivery of a mortgage for £30,000, judgment
notes, etc., the whole aggregating upwards of one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars. There was also a written statement
delivered declaring the gift of the bond and of the two mortgages. A judgment on the bond was also conveyed by the
said statement.
The House of Lords decided that delivery of the mortgage
attested the gift of the debt it secured, and that the debt being
given, carried with it the mortgage. Lord Eldon commented
at large on the objection that conveyance of land should be in
accordance with the statute of frauds, and held that the
objection could not stand; that the conveyance was of the
mortgage debt and not of the land.
The second difficulty was as to perfecting gifts mortis cansa
void at law. This, as has been seen, was done first in Snelgrove v. Bailey, where the chancellor perfected the gift of a
bond, although the gift was void at law. And although Lord
Hardwicke afterwards said, in Ward v. Turner, that he could
go no further than he went in Sneigrove v. Bailey, we have
seen that he meant that he could not extend aid where the
instrument did not represent the debt in a manner that made
it a means of getting possession of the money. In Duflield v.
Biwes, Lord Eldon said that the principle that equity will
perfect donations mortis causa when the donor has parted with
'See Richards v. Sims, 2 Atk. 319; Hassel v. Tyorte, i Axub. 1318;
Hirst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351 ; Duffield v. :Elwes, 1 Bli. N. P. 497.
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the means of getting at the property ought not to be narrowed
by mere technicalities; that the chancellor ought not to lay
stress, therefore, on Lord Hardwicke's remarks respecting
bonds as distinguished from most other instruments representing property, especially as one of the peculiarities relied upon
by that judge, namely, the need of profert in suit on the bond,
was so very technical that now it is no longer necessary, when
the bond is lost. Accordingly, the House of Lords preferred
a more general rule. It was determined, then, that because
the mortgage represented the debt, "formed part of the title,"
the debt itself passed, not, indeed, at lawv, nor yet in equity, as
against the donor mortis catsa, but passed sufficiently for
equity to recognize, and perfect the conveyance if the donor
regarded the transaction as a complete act, and died without
revoking the gift: on the ground that this would not be
against the donor, but in furtherance of his intent. The
executor of the donor was therefore considered in equity as
trustee for the donee, and the latter could use the name of the
executor in a suit on the security.
All this reasoning applies to many other securities, or
evidences of undertaking. Hence, the principle has been
applied to uphold gifts of a third persons note' although payable to order and unendorsed'; to gifts by delivery of a bill of
exchange of a third person payable to donor's order, although
unendorsed, 3 or by delivery of certificate of deposit likewise
payable to order and unendorsed.'
1

Borneman v. Seidlinger, 15 Maine, 429; Turpin v. Thompson, 3 Met.
(Ky.) 42o; Sessions v. Mosley, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 87; Bates v. Kempton, 7
Gray (Mass.), 382; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 6i; Holley v. Adams,
I6 Vt. 2o6.
2
Veal v. Veal, 27 Beavan, 3o3; Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn. 40;
Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340; Daniel v. Smith, 64 Cal. 346. In
Brown v. Brown, delivery of note secured by mortgage was held to pass
the mortgage. See also Jones on Mortgages, par. 817.
3
Rankin v. Weguelin, 27 Beav. 309.
'Conner v. Root, (Cal.) 17 Pac. Rep. 773; Basket v. Hassel, 107 U. S.
602; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. 349; Ames v. Witt, 33 Beav. 619;
In re Taylor, 56 I. I. Rep. (U. S.) 597; Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y.
34o; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 5 Ont. 45o; Stephenson v. King, 2 Bush. (Ky.)
228; Moore v. Moore, 18 E q. 474.
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In New York, following the theory of these and other
decisions, gifts of certificates of stock have been sustained in
equity, although the transfers had not been transferred on the
corporation books' and hence not good against the company.
The principle has been applied in cases of gifts of savingsbanks. The ordinary savings-bank book does not represent
the debt due by the bank. Suit cannot be brought on the
book as it can on a mortgage, a bond, a note. The action is.
on the debt, whereof the book is not a representation. It isnot itself a promise by the bank to pay. It is, however,.
emphatically a part of "the means of getting at the possession" of the money deposited, for the usual rule of savings
banks is that the money will not be paid except on presentation of the book. Here it is that Lord Hardwicke's rule and
Lord Eldon's in Snelgrove v. Bailey and Duffield v. lwes,
finds its operation. Being the means of getting at the possession, delivery of the book by the depositor will support a
gift mortis causa. Such a delivery is a striking evidence of a
surrender and delivery of dominion. This has been held in
I Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251 ; approved in I. Parson's Contracts,
237. See St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. i5o; Brown
v. Smith, 122 Mass. 589 ; Fitchburg Sag. Bk. v. Torrey, 134 Mass. 239 ;
Hall v. U. S. Ins. Co., 5 Gill (Md.), 484; Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17 ;
Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365; Cook v. Stock, 378; DosPassos on Stock Brokers, 623. See I Morawetz on Private Corporations,
226.
It is true, indeed, that there is some slight indication of a disposition in
one or two Bnglish cases to treat certificates of stock as merely executoryin their nature. See Moore v. Moore, z8 Bq. Ca. 474; Lambert v.
Overton, 13 W. R. 227, is ambiguous. In Maryland, an attempt to make
a gift by delivery of the certificates with the endorsement of their owner
was held to be of no avail: Pennington v. Gitting's Est., 2 Gill & J. 208,
i83 o . But the prevailing rule would seem to be as indicated in the text See Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray (Mass.), 227. The reasoning of Duffin v.
Duffin, 44 Ch. D. (1890) 76, is both very strong and very aliroos; in that
case, a deposit note was held by the Court of Appeals to be the valid
subject of a donalio morlis causa. The note bore considerable analogy to
savings-bank books; it had on its back a form of check to be signed on
withdrawal. Cotton, L. J., said: "If the document was lost, they would.
require some explanation why it was not forthcoming before they paid
the money, but I do not think that they could refuse to pay." The gift
was sustained.
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so many cases that the mere citation of the authorities is
somewhat of a task. They are given in the note.'
Pennsylvania,2 and possibly Maryland,' have decided otherwise. In Great Britain the question remains open.' There is
considerable reason to believe that the Pennsylvania court will
yet apply the same rule to gifts of savings-bank books as it
has applied to securities, and uphold the donations.5
The principle of Sne/grove v. Bailey and Duffield v. Oiwes,
that delivery of "the way of coming at the possession" is

IMassachusetts: Pierce v. Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 425. See also
Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472; Rockwood v. Wiggins, i6 Gray (Mass.),
402; Debinson v. Emmons (Mass.), 33 N. E. Rep. 706.
New York: Ridden v. Thrall, 26 N. E. Rep. 627; Walsh v. Bowery
Savings Bank, 26 N. B. Rep. 627. See Fiero v. Fiero, 2 Hun. 6oo, where
the case turned on evidence. And see Orr v. McGregor, 43 Hun. 531.
Connecticut: Brown v. Brown, i8 Conn. 410; Camp's Appeal, 36
Conn. 88.
Rhode Island: Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536. And seeProvidence
Institution for Savings v. Taft, 14 R. I. 502.
Maine: Curtis v. Portland Savings Bank, 77 Maine, I5r ; S. C., 52 Am.
Rep. 750. See also Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Maine, 364, a case of gift
inter vivos.
Alabama: Jones v. Weakley, 12 S. E].Rep. 42o, a dictum.
Kentucky: In this State it has been declared that, so far as the early
cases of Ashbrook v. Ryan, 2 Bush, 228, is opposed to the validity of a
gift by delivery of the savings-bank book, it is to be regarded as overruled: Stephenson v. King, 8i Ky. 425See also the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in the
-elaborate opinion in Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602. See also Morse on
Banks and Banking, 3d Ed., by Prof. Parsons, par. 6o8; Foss v. Lowell
Iive Cents Savings Bank, ii Mass. 285; Camp's Appeal, 30 Conn. 88;
Brown v. Brown, I8 Conn. 410; Davis v Ney, 125 Mass. 59o.
In Vermont the question was left undecided in a case in 1867: French
v. Raymond, 39 Vt. 623.
2

3

Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177.

Murray v. Cannon, 4r Md. 466. It is of some significance that, in
Consar v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, the court's remarks were directed rather
to the donee's omission to observe certain requirements of the donor.
Had the court been opposed to such gifts, these remarks would have been
needless.
'See McGonnell v. Murray, Irish Rep. 3 Eq. 450 (1869). In In reBeak,
L. R. :3 Eq. 489, the decision is rested on the fact that the savings-bank
book did not embody the terms of the contract. See Duffin v. Duffin,
note, supra.
5
See Commonwealth v. Crompton, 137 Pa. 138, at p. 147.
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delivery of dominion and will uphold the gift, has been applied
in cases of delivery of the following other instruments : a third
person's check,' attorney's receipt for obligation filed in a suit,'
policy of insurance,' or bill of sale of the policy.4
The review that has just been given of the development and
extent of the doctrine of equitable gifts mortis causa shows that
the House of Lords has been followed fully in its decision in
Duffield v. Elwes,' to the effect that "the principle of not
assisting a volunteer to perfect an incomplete gift does not
apply to a donatio mortis causa," 6 and in the principle likewise
recognized by them that, where the means of getting at
possession is delivered, equity will regard the gift as complete.
In the concluding part of this article, we will take up the
question whether the donor's own check can be the subject of
Luther E. Hewitt.
a gift mortis causa.
(To be concluded.)
Philadelphia,April

1

5,

1897.

Burke v. Bishop, 27 La. An. 465.
v. Keen, 4 Lehigh (Va.), 333, cited in Yancey v. Fields (Va.),
8 S. E. Rep. 721.
' Ames v. Witt, 33 Beav. 619 ; R. Hughes, 36 W. R. 821.
4
Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343.
5I. Bli. N. R. 497.
6 Quoting Lindley, L. J., in Duffin v. Duffin, 44 Ch. D. 76, 83 (189o).
2 Elam

